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A so-called “asset market meltdown hypothesis” predicts that baby boomers’ large 
savings will drive asset market booms that will eventually collapse because of the 
boomers’ large retirement dissavings. As good news to baby boomers, our analysis shows 
that this meltdown hypothesis is fundamentally flawed; and baby-boom-driven asset 
market booms may not necessarily collapse. However, bad news is that, in the case where 
meltdowns are about to happen, forward-looking baby boomers’ attempts to escape them 
will be futile and may lead the economy into a “liquidity trap”.  (JEL E21, E22, E44, 
G12) 
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1.  Introduction 
A so-called “asset market meltdown hypothesis” predicts that baby boomers’ large 
amount of savings during their “prime saving years” will drive asset market booms that 
will eventually collapse as the boomers start dissaving during their retirements. Poterba 
(2001) provides a succinct explanation to the rationale behind this hypothesis by using 
the following equation:  
) (wN s qK = ,   (1.1)  
whose left and right-hand sides represent asset supply and demand respectively.  Given 
constant asset supply (K), wage rate (w) and saving rate (s), equation (1.1) clearly 
indicates a positive relationship between asset price (q) and the number of savers (N). 
Thus, while a high N during baby boomers’ prime saving ages tends to drive up q, a low 
N during their retirements will bring it down.  
Such a simplified justification of the meltdown hypothesis certainly depends on 
strong assumptions on K, w and s. Yet more sophisticated studies in the literature also 
generally support the hypothesis (Abel, 2003; Brook, 2000; Yoo, 1994; among others).
1  
In this paper we take a deeper look at the meltdown hypothesis and provide some new 
insights that have not been well recognized by the existing literature.  
First, it is worth clarifying that baby booms can affect asset returns through asset 
prices as well as asset earnings.
2 Yet, by assuming the so-called “putty-putty” investment 
technology, many studies (e.g. Brooks, 2000; Yoo, 1994) essentially abstract away the 
impact of baby booms on asset prices, and capture only their impacts on asset earnings.  
Without asset price fluctuations, baby-boom impacts on asset returns tend to be limited. 
                                                 
1 See Poterba (2001) for a review and references therein. 
2 While the baby-boom impact on asset prices is explained by the aforementioned Poterba’s (2001) 
interpretation, that on asset earnings is through capital-labor ratio.   - 3 -
For example, in simulating the impacts of a baby boom-bust cycle on asset returns based 
on a putty-putty model, Brooks (2000) finds that the rate of return to capital is peaked at 
4.64 percent during the baby boom, and bottomed at 4.45 percent during the baby bust. 
As an exception, Abel (2003), in studying the impacts of baby booms on asset prices 
and capital accumulation, assumes convex investment adjustment costs and hence takes 
into consideration of baby-boom impact on asset prices. Lim and Weil (2003) also 
consider convex “installation costs” in their study on the baby-boom impact on stock 
market booms, and point out that the magnitude of the impact is positively related to 
installation costs.  
In this paper, instead of assuming convex investment adjustment costs, we consider 
the risk aversion of entrepreneurs as another “investment impediment” that reduces 
investment elasticity. We find that, not surprisingly, the more risk-averse the 
entrepreneurs are; or in general, the less elastic the investments are, the greater the baby-
boom-driven asset market booms will be. 
The surprising result of our analysis is with respect to the prediction that baby-boom-
driven asset price booms will meltdown during baby boomers’ retirement ages. Although 
there are some debates on whether some real-world factors (such as bequest motives or 
foreign savings) can help preventing the potential meltdown,
3 theoretical research in the 
literature generally supports the meltdown hypothesis per se (e.g. Abel, 2003). However, 
                                                 
3 One argument against the meltdown hypothesis claims that people in the real world usually do not deplete 
their wealth before they die (Poterba, 2001). However, Abel (2001) shows that baby boomers’ bequest 
motives may not help attenuating the potential meltdown. Another popular argument against the meltdown 
hypothesis claims that foreign demands on domestic assets can help preventing the meltdown. However, 
facing similar ageing problems, major developed countries (e.g. Japan) are not likely to provide such 
demands. Developing countries (e.g. China) may (or may not) be able to provide the demands; yet the 
resulting current account deficits may not be a pleasant side effect. Moreover, the so-called Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) clouds any hope for relying on savings from abroad.    - 4 -
we find the meltdown hypothesis to be fundamentally flawed, and show that the 
meltdown is indeed state-contingent and may not necessarily happen. 
Unfortunately, the meltdown is still possible. Then, an intriguing question is whether 
forward-looking baby boomers can escape the potential meltdown by holding assets free 
from price fluctuations? Or as specifically asked by Abel (2003, p.552),  “if these 
investors are forward-looking in the first place, would they so eagerly buy stocks that are 
destined to fall in price eventually?” However, by using a model with capital being the 
only store of value, Abel (2003) gives those unfortunate investors no other choices.  
Brooks (2000), on the other hand, does give baby boomers in his model a chance to 
hold riskless bonds that essentially represent their lendings to younger generations. Yet 
he finds that the option does not help baby boomers to avoid being hurt by a low rate of 
return during their retirement ages. This should not be surprised. After all, as baby-boom-
induced asset market fluctuations are fundamentally driven by savings and dissavings, 
forward-looking baby boomers’ attempts to avoid potential asset price meltdowns (by 
holding short-term or riskless assets) will tend to depress the general interest rate level for 
the entire asset markets.  
However, a conjecture is that, as the existence of money creates a zero-interest bound, 
forward-looking investors should at least be able to protect themselves against severe 
future meltdowns that imply negative returns to capital.
4 Our analysis confirms this 
conjecture. Nevertheless, we find that the escape will be at the cost of a “liquidity trap”.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the baby-
boom impact on asset market performances. Section 3 discusses what would happen 
                                                 
4 Negative returns are not possible in Brooks’ (2000) model that assumes the putty-putty investment 
technology. Yet, we will show that they are possible when baby-boom impacts on asset prices are taken 
into consideration.    - 5 -
when forward-looking baby boomers foresee potential meltdowns. We conclude the 
paper in section 4.  
 
2.  Baby boom and asset market performances 
During their prime saving ages, baby boomers’ large amount of savings will put upward 
pressures on asset prices. Yet the magnitude of resulting asset price appreciation depends 
on investment elasticity—the higher the elasticity is, the more the pressures can be 
absorbed by increases in capital stock; hence the less the price appreciation will be. 
Notwithstanding, as long as investments are not perfectly elastic, asset price appreciation 
will happen.  
It is tempting to apply a similar argument to hypothesize the following: With 
insufficient asset demand due to a small number of workers, baby boomers’ large amount 
of dissavings in their retirements, representing massive asset supply, will cause asset 
market meltdowns. While such an argument is generally accepted by the existing 
literature, it has actually missed a crucial yet underappreciated point. That is, while asset 
supply tends to be high during baby boomers’ retirement eras, so will be asset demand. 
This is because the large capital stock built up by baby boomers’ savings will have 
positive influence on incomes and hence savings during baby boomers’ retirement eras.  
Therefore, a conjecture is that, while baby boomers’ large savings tend to drive asset 
market booms, asset market meltdowns may not necessarily follow. We examine this 
conjecture in the following. 
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The Model 
We use a two-period OLG model similar to the one used by Abel (2003). One major 
difference is that, while Abel (2003) models convex investment adjustment costs as an 
“investment impediment” responsible for less than perfectly elastic investments, the 
impediment modeled here is risk-averse investment behaviors. In addition, we introduce 




At the beginning of period t,  t y N ,  numbers of identical young consumers are born, each 
of whom will supply inelastically one unit of labor during the period and receives wage 
income ( t w ) at the end of which. After paying tax ( t T ), an individual young consumer 
consumes  t y c ,  and saves in capital ( t y k , ) and/or government bond ( t y d , ). She carries over 
her assets into and retires during the next period t+1; and at the end of which she finishes 
her life cycle by using the gross returns to her savings to finance her old-age consumption 
( 1 , + t o c ).  
At the end of period t, a period-t young consumer faces the following optimizing 
problem:  
)] log( ) 1 ( ) [log( 1 ,
1
, +
− + + t o t y t c c E Max θ , 
subject to:  
t t t y t y t t y T w d k q c − = + + , , ,    (2.1) 
and     - 7 -
) 1 ( ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 , + + + + + + + = t t y t t t y t o r d R q k c ,   (2.2) 
where variables  t R ,  t r , and  t q  are, respectively, the period-t (per unit) capital income (in 
terms of consumption), the period-t (bond) interest rate, and the capital price (in terms of 
consumption goods) at the end of period t; and parameter q represents time preference.    
The (government) bond is a one-period coupon bond denominated in consumption 
goods. Capital is free from default risks and hence a perfect substitute of bond.  Thus, the 
equilibrium (expected) return to one unit of capital should be equal to the return to 
equivalent bond investment. With capital prices at qt, one unit of capital is equivalent (in 
return) to qt units of bond; thus,  
t t t t t t q r q q E R 1 1 1 + + + = − + ,   (2.3) 
according to which the budget constraints (2.1) and (2.2) can be combined into  




1 1 , , ) 1 ( . 
Therefore, first order conditions give the individual young consumption function  
) ( ) 2 )( 1 (
1
, t t t y T w c − + + =
− θ θ ,  
which, with  t y N ,  number of identical young consumers, gives the (aggregate) young 
consumption function:  
t y t t t y N T w C ,
1
, ) ( ) 2 )( 1 ( − + + =
− θ θ .   (2.4) 
As period-t old consumers finance their consumption via the gross returns to their assets, 
the (aggregate) period-t old consumption function is given by  
) 1 ( ) ( 1 , 1 , , t t y t t t y t o r D R q K C + + + = − −    (2.5) 
where  1 , 1 , 1 , − − − = t y t y t y k N K  and  1 , 1 , 1 , − − − = t y t y t y d N D . 
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Firms 
In every period, identical, profit-maximizing, and perfectly competitive firms hire capital 




1 ) , ( t t t t t L K L K F Y , (2.6) 




In every period, identical entrepreneurs engage in investing activities that transforms 
consumption goods into new capital.
5 Note that capital is irreversible; and its value 
depends on capital income and capital price (both in terms of consumption).  
An individual entrepreneur j chooses the amount of investment (
j





t EU Max Π  
where ) ( t t t t I c I q − = Π  represents investment profits— ) (I c  is the investment cost 
(function) in terms of consumption.  
                                                 
5 The separation of investment activities from production activities here is similar to the “two sector” 
modeling framework adopted by Abel (2003). As opposed to firms being the producers of consumption 
goods, entrepreneurs here represent activities devoted to capital formation. We do not explicitly model who 
these entrepreneurs are, but simply assume they always exist. Indeed, we can let some of the young 
consumers be workers and the rest be entrepreneurs. Yet the results will not be different.  
6 The utility rather than profit maximization is for the purpose of modeling risk-averse investment 
behaviors; otherwise, utility and profit maximizations are equivalent   - 9 -
If any, entrepreneurs will hold investment profits earned at the end of period t in form 
of capital and sell them at the end of period t+1 for consumption. Thus, period-t 
entrepreneurs’ consumption is given by 
) / )( ( 1 1 , − − Π + = t t t t t e q R q C .   (2.7)  
Investments are risky with a stochastic cost function:  






t z I I c + = , (2.8) 
where ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N zt  is a normally distributed random variable. Entrepreneurs are risk-
averse with utility function:  
Π − − = Π
ϕ e U ) ( , (2.9) 
where parameter j measures (constant) absolute risk aversion.  
According to equations (2.8) and (2.9), entrepreneur j’s maximizing problem 
becomes  
∫
− − − Π − − = Π Π − = Π
] 2 / ) 1 [(
2 2
) ( ) (
















e d f e U E Max , 
the solution to which gives the individual investment function: 
j
t t I q
2 1 ϕσ + = . Then, the 







+ = , (2.10) 
where 
j
t t nI I =  represents the aggregate investment.
7 
Equation (2.10) implies that under risky investments (σ  > 0) and risk-averse 
entrepreneurs (ϕ > 0), the aggregate investment is not perfectly elastic; and its elasticity 
                                                 
7 Notwithstanding based on risk aversion, equation (2.10) is similar to Abel and Eberly’s (1997) investment 
function (equation 15 in their paper) based on quadratic adjustment costs.    - 10 -
is negatively correlated with the riskiness of investments and the risk aversion of 
entrepreneurs.  
Given a large number of entrepreneurs ( 0 >> n ) and according to the law of large 












t t I nI z n I I c I c = = + = = ∑ ∑
=1
) ( ) ( ) ( , (2.11) 
which implies constant marginal cost of investment in aggregate. Note that, 
notwithstanding the constant marginal investment cost in aggregate, aggregate investment 




Government uses tax revenues and bond issuance to finance its expenditures including 
(bond) interest payments and government consumption (assumed to be zero for 
simplicity). Thus,  
t t t t y t D r D N T = + &
, ,   (2.12) 




The period-t capital stock ( t K ) is equal to period-t old consumers’ capital holding plus 
entrepreneurs’ investment profits earned in period t-1 and held in form of capital in 
period t. Thus,    - 11 -
1 1 1 , / − − − Π + = t t t y t q K K    (2.13) 
The period-t bond stock ( t D ) is solely held by period-t old consumers. Thus, 
1 , − = t y t D D    (2.14) 
 
Equilibrium  
There are five markets: (consumption) goods, labor, rental capital, capital, and bond. 
Take consumption as the numeraire.  
The goods market is in equilibrium when consumption output is completely absorbed 
by the consumption of young consumers, old consumers, entrepreneurs, plus the costs for 
investments; i.e.,  ) ( , , , t t e t o t y t I c C C C Y + + + = , which, according to equations (2.4), (2.5), 
(2.6), (2.7), (2.11), (2.13) and (2.14), can be transformed into 
t t t t t t t y t t t t I r D R q K N T w L K F + + + + + − + + =
− ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 )( 1 ( ) , ( ,
1 θ θ . (2.15) 
As each of young consumers (as the only source of labor) inelastically supplies one unit 
of labor, the labor supply function is given by 
t y t N L , = .   (2.16) 
The demand for labor comes from firms, who (under perfect competition) will pay factors 
by their marginal products. Thus, according to equation (2.6), the labor demand function 
is given by 
) , ( 2 t t t L K F w = , (2.17) 
which, with inelastic labor supply, determines the labor market-clearing wage rate. 
Similarly, as the supply of rental-capital is inelastic and equal to the existing capital 
stock, the market-clearing rental rate is determined by the rental-capital demand function    - 12 -
) , ( 1 t t t L K F R = .   (2.18) 
As the supply of existing capital stock is inelastic, the supply-side equilibrium condition 
for the capital market is determined by the aggregate investment function [equation 
(2.10)], which can be notationally summarized into 
t t I q η + =1 , (2.19) 
where coefficient  n /
2 ϕσ η =  is negatively correlated with the q-elasticity of investments 
(“investment elasticity” in short).  
Equation (2.3), which is essentially a capital demand function, can be rearranged into 
t
t t t t
t q







1    (2.20) 
where, according to equations (2.16) and (2.18), 
 ) , ( 1 , 1 1 1 + + + = t y t t N K F R . (2.21) 
Suppose government keeps its debt level constant at D  via balancing its budget in every 
period (i.e.  0 = t D & ), then the supply-side bond market equilibrium condition is given by   
D Dt = ,   (2.22) 
and, according to equation (2.12)  
t t t y t D r N T = , ,   (2.23) 
According to Walras’ Law, the demand-side bond market equilibrium is implied by 
equilibria in the other markets.   
Finally, assume no capital depreciation for simplicity; then the capital accumulation is 
governed by  
t t t I K K + = +1    (2.24)    - 13 -
 
Summary 
At the end of period t, the equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the 
simultaneous system composed of equations (2.15)-(2.24), in which variables Ny,t and 
Ny,t+1 are exogenous demographic features; variables Kt and rt are initial conditions 
exogenously determined by history; variables Lt, wt, Tt, qt, Rt, Dt, It, rt+1, Rt+1, and Kt+1 are 
endogenously determined; and variable Etqt+1 depends on agents’ expectations that are 
assumed to be rational in this paper.  
 
Dynamics of capital stock and capital price 
According to the simultaneous system (2.15)-(2.24), the dynamics of capital 










= − = + 1
1 &  (2.25) 
where 
α α λ α θ
− − − + =
1
,
1 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( t y t
g
t N K S  measures the gross saving of the economy;
8 and 
) 2 ( ) 2 (
1 θ θ + + + = Λ
−
t r  is a summarizing notation.  
For analytical convenience, let  0 = D .
9 Then, according to equation (2.25), the steady 
state ( 0 = t K & ) capital stock with constant population ( N N t y = , ) can be determined by 
the following equation: 
0 *
* = −K S
g ,   (2.26) 
where 
α α λ α θ
− − − + =
1 * 1 * ) 1 ( ) 2 ( N K S
g
t . Equation (2.25) implies that 
                                                 
8 It is not difficult to verify that  t y t
g
t C w S , − =  
9 The inclusion of government bond in the model is to facilitate analysis in the next section.     - 14 -
2 ) 1 )]( ( ) 1 )( 1 / [( /




t t t K K S K K S K K η η η α & .   (2.27) 
According to equations (2.26) and (2.27),  
0 / * < ∂ ∂
=K K t t
t K K & .   (2.28) 
Thus, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.1 The steady state K* is unique and stable. 
Corollary 2.1  
* K Kt < ∀ ,  0 > t K & .  
Proof: According to equation (2.26), K* is unique. According to inequality (2.28), K* is 
stable. With a unique and stable K*, Corollary 2.1 is self-evident.   
 
Put plainly, given initial K0 less than the steady-state K*—which is what we consider 
here—capital stock will be on a monotonic upward trend until it reaches the steady state.   
The dynamics of K convergence can be characterized by the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2.2 : ] , 0 (
~ * K K ∈ ∃ 0 / ~ = ∂ ∂
=K K t t t K K & . 
Corollary 2.2     : )
~
, 0 ( K Kt ∈ ∀ 0 / > ∂ ∂ t t K K & . 
Corollary 2.3     : ] ,
~
(
* K K Kt ∈ ∀ 0 / < ∂ ∂ t t K K & . 
Proof: According to equation (2.27), it is not difficult to verify that  t t K K ∂ ∂ / &  is a 
monotonically decreasing function of Kt, and  ∞ → ∂ ∂




& . Thus, with inequality 
(2.28),  K
~
 must exist; and Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3 must hold.  
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According to Propositions 2.1 and 2.2., the growth path of Kt can be graphically depicted 
by Figure 1, with the  K Kt
~
<  portion being convex and the  K Kt
~
>  portion concave.  
Accordingly, the dynamic of capital price can be characterized by the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 2.3 For  )
~
, 0 ( K Kt ∈ , qt will be positively correlated with Kt and hence on an 
upward trend; whereas, for  ] ,
~
(
* K K Kt ∈ ,  qt will be negatively correlated with Kt and 
hence on a downward trend.    
Proof: According to equation (2.19),  0 / > t t K d dq & —note that  t t I K = & —which, together 
with Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3, implies that  0 /
)
~
, 0 ( > ∂ ∂




* < ∂ ∂
∈ K K K t t
t K q . 
Accordingly, as  0 *) , 0 ( > ∈ K K t t K & , we have  0
)
~
, 0 ( >





∈ K K K t
t q & . 
 
Intuitively, the sign of q-K correlation depends on the balance between two opposite 
influences of K on q. On the one hand, K per se represents capital supply and hence has a 
negative influence over q directly. On the other hand, K also has a positive influence over 
q indirectly through savings that represent asset demand—note that a large K can help 
generating large wage incomes. As the balance of the two effects cannot be determined a 
priori, the sign of the q-K correlation is state contingent. With diminishing marginal 
product of capital, the positive (indirect) effect tends to prevail when K is small, and be 
dominated when K is large.  
As will be shown later, when q is positively correlated with K and on an upward 
trend, the meltdown may not necessarily happen.    - 16 -
 
Baby-boom effect on capital accumulation 














t y  ,  
where  N N
b >  measures the magnitude of the baby boom. With this assumption, we 
consider a situation with a constant number of newborns over time except a spike in 
period zero caused by a baby boom.
10 Thus, while period zero represents the baby 
boomers’ saving ages, period one represents their retirement ages.  
As it is not difficult to verify that  0 / , > ∂ ∂ t y
g
t N S , equation (2.25) implies that a 
permanent population growth (from  N  to 
b N ) in time t = 0 will shift up the capital 
growth path from  N K0  to 
b N K0  in Figure 2. Yet, as the high newborn level 
b N  is 
temporary and will drop back to N  in time t = 1, the baby-boom effect on capital 
accumulation will be characterized by the path  N N K
b
0  in Figure 2.  
Specifically, we have the following proposition regarding the effect of the period-zero 
baby boom on K1. 
 
Proposition 2.4 A period-zero baby boom has a positive effect on capital stock in period 
one; i.e.,  0 / 1 >
b dN dK .  
                                                 
10 Admittedly being a special case, this simplified modeling captures the feature of baby booms that 
motivates the meltdown hypothesis. That is, a low dependency ratio during boomers’ saving ages and a 
high ratio during their retirements. Similar modeling has been used in the literature: In a model with zero 
population growth in general, Brooks (2000) models a baby-boom-baby-bust cycle by assuming two 
periods of 2% population growth followed by two periods of -2% growth. Note that the assumption of a 
“baby bust” that reduces the number of newborns to the pre-baby-boom level may not be realistic; yet it is 
innocuous to our main point that meltdown may not necessarily happen.   - 17 -
 Proof: According to equation (2.25),  0 ) / ( ) 1 ( / 0
1
0 1 > + =
− b g b dN dS K dN dK η .  
 
When q and K are positively correlated—recall Proposition 2.3 for its possibility, that 
0 / 1 >
b dN dK  will imply  0 / 1 >
b dN dq ; i.e., a positive impact of period-zero baby boom 
on period-one capital price. This is the key for the meltdown not to happen. We will 
come back to this point later. First let us examine the baby-boom impact on q0. 
 
Baby boom and capital price boom 
 According to the simultaneous system (2.15)-(2.24), the capital price at the end of period 
t is given by  
( )
α α θ α ηλ η
− − − + − + + =
1
,
1 1 ) 2 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( t y t t t N K K q . (2.29) 
Thus, the period-zero capital price will be  
( )
α α θ α ηλ η




0 0 ) 2 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
b N K K q , (2.30) 
which implies 
  ( )
α α θ α ηλ η
− − − + − + =
b b N K K dN dq 0
1 2 1
0 0 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( / .   (2.31) 
Given 0 > η , equation (2.31) implies  
0 d / d 0 >
b N q    (2.32) 
and  
0 / ) d / (d 0 > ∂ ∂ η
b N q ,  
which give the following propositions. 
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Proposition 2.5 If investments are not perfectly elastic (i.e.  0 > η ), a period-zero baby 
boom will have a positive impact on  q0. 
Corollary 2.4 Ceteris paribus, the lower the investment elasticity (i.e., the higher the h) 
is, the larger the baby-boom impact on q0 will be.  
 
Since investments in reality can hardly be perfectly elastic, Proposition 2.5 supports the 
first part of the meltdown hypothesis. That is, a baby boom tends to drive capital market 
boom during baby boomers’ saving ages. Nevertheless, Corollary 2.4 suggests that the 
magnitude of the boom negatively depends on investment elasticity.  
 
Baby boom and capital market meltdown  
We proceed to examine whether a period-zero baby boom will cause a capital market 
meltdown in period one. We first examine the impact of the baby boom on q1.   
According to equation (2.29),   
) ( / 1 1 1 K dK dq Γ =η ,   (2.33) 
where 
α α α α θ α ηλ θ α λα
− − − − − + − − − + − = Γ
1
1
1 2 1 1
1
1
1 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 2 )( 1 ( ) ( N K N K K . Equation 
(2.33), together with  
b b b dN dq dN dI dN dK / / / 0
1
0 1
− = = η , implies that  
b b dN dq K dN dq / ) ( / 0 1 1 Γ = . (2.34) 
With  1 < α , it is not difficult to verify that,  0 / 1 < ∂ Γ ∂ K , ∞ = Γ
→ ) ( lim 1 0 1
K
K , and  0 ) (
* < Γ K . 
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which implies the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 2.6 The effect of a period-zero baby boom on period-one capital price is 
state contingent. 
Corollary 2.5 In the case of  K K ˆ
1 > , a period-zero baby boom will have a negative 
impact on q1.   
Corollary 2.6 In the case of  K K ˆ
1 < , a period-zero baby boom will have a positive 
impact on q1. 
 
The result in Corollary 2.6 may seem counterintuitive: As there are not enough workers 
(savers) to demand baby boomers’ large asset supply in period one, the baby boom 
should have a negative impact on q1. However, a crucial yet underappreciated point in the 
spirit of “Say’s Law” is that baby boomer’s large savings can create its own demand. 
This is because the large K1 built up by baby boomers’ large savings will have a positive 
impact on period-one income (and hence saving) that represents a demand-side force on 
q1. When the marginal product of capital (MPK) is sufficiently large,
11 this demand-side 
force can be strong enough to prevail over the downward pressure (on q1) produced by 
the large K1 together with the small  ) ( 1 , N N y = .  
                                                 
11 This is why the positive baby-boom impact on q1 tends to happen when K is small.    - 20 -
As shown in Appendix, 
b dN dq / 1  will be positive when  1 1 q sMPK > , where 
) 1 ( ) 2 (
1 α θ − + =




1 1 N K MPK . 
Put plainly, when the “marginal saving” of capital is more than enough to purchase one 
unit of capital, the more the K1 built up by baby boomers’ large savings, the higher the q1 
will be.  
It should be noted that, even when a period-zero baby boom has a positive impact on 
q1, asset market meltdown can still happen when the impact is less than the positive baby-
boom impact on q0; i.e., if  0 d / ) d( 0 - 1 < ∆
b N q , where  0 1 0 - 1 q q q − ≡ ∆ . Yet we will show 
that  0 d / ) d( 0 - 1 > ∆
b N q  is possible; i.e., a period-zero baby boom can have a positive 
impact on the capital price movement in period one. Put plainly, the meltdown may not 
necessarily happen. 
According equation (2.34), 
b b dN dq dN q d / ) 1 ( / 0 0 1 − Γ = ∆ − . As  0 / 1 < ∂ Γ ∂ K , 
∞ = Γ
→ ) ( lim 1 0 1
K
K  and  0 ) (
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which implies that the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.7 The impact of a period-zero baby boom on period-one capital price 
variation is state contingent. 
Corollary 2.7 In the case of  K K ˆ ˆ
1 > , a period-zero baby boom will have a negative 
impact on capital price movement in period one.    - 21 -
Corollary 2.8 In the case of  K K ˆ ˆ
1 < , a period-zero baby boom will have a positive 
impact on capital price movement in period one.  
 
Proposition 2.7 implies that the widely-accepted meltdown hypothesis is flawed—baby-
boom-driven asset market booms may not necessarily collapse but rather keep booming 
during baby boomers retirement ages.  
Intuitively, the higher the baby-boom-driven q0 is, the higher the K1 will be. When K 
and q are positive correlated, a higher K1 will imply a higher q1. As the magnitude of the 
impact of K on q can be very large—it is not difficult to verify from equation (2.33) that 
∞ =
→ 1 1 0 / lim
1
dK dq
K —the positive baby-boom impact on q1 can outweigh its impact on q0 
so that the meltdown will not happen. 
Graphically, in Figure 3, the upward and downward trends of the hump-shaped q path 
correspond respectively to the portions of  K Kt
~
<  and  K Kt
~
>  in Figure 1. In a situation 
where the q-path is downward-sloping, a period-zero baby boom will drive q0 up to point 
g, higher than point e where q0 would have been without the baby boom. Similar to the 
capital price dynamics in Abel’s (2003) model, q1 will be mean-reverting. As the baby 
boom will increase K1 relative to its “non-baby-boom” level, q1 will drop to the point h, 
which is lower than it would have been without the baby boom (i.e., the point f). 
Although q is on a downward trend even without the baby boom (from e to f), the q 
depreciation with the baby boom (from g to h) is clearly of a greater magnitude. In this 
sense, the baby boom has caused a capital market meltdown in period one.  
However, the situation where the q-path is upward-sloping is less straightforward. 
Similarly, a period-zero baby boom will drive q0 up to point c; and q1 will be mean   - 22 -
reverting. Yet, as q is on an upward trend, its mean reversion can have different 
implications.  If q1 only reverts to point b, we can say the baby boom has caused a 
“meltdown” in the sense the q appreciation with baby boom (i.e. from c to b) is less than 
it would have been without the baby boom (i.e., from a to b). However, as the period-
zero baby boom will increase K1, mean-reverting q1 tends to be higher than point b. 
Indeed, it could reach point d (or higher), where the q appreciation from c to d is greater 
than that from a to b. In this situation, as the period-zero baby boom has a positive impact 
on q movement in period one, the meltdown does not happen.  
 
Baby boom and the rate of return to capital market 
Even when a period-zero baby boom has a positive impact on capital price movement in 
period one (i.e.  0 d / d 0 - 1 > ∆
b N q ),  it can still have a negative impact on the rate of return 
to capital in period one, because of its negative impact on capital income through capital-
labor ratio. Indeed, we find that in our model the baby boom will definitely have a 
negative impact on the period-one rate of return to capital; i.e.,  0 / 1 <







=    (2.35)   
represents the rate of return to capital in period one.  
According to equations (2.21) and (2.29), we have   
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where   - 23 -
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According to Proposition (2.4), inequality (2.36) implies  
0 / ) ( 1 1 < +
b dN R q d ,   (2.37) 
which, together with inequality (2.32), implies  
0 / 1 <
b dN dRR .   (2.38)  
Inequality (2.38) implies the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.8 A period-zero baby boom will definitely reduce the rate of return to 
capital in period one. 
 
This result shows that in our model, even when a period-zero baby boom has a positive 
impact on period-one capital price movement, the impact will be dominated by the 
negative baby-boom effect on capital income.  
 
3.  Baby boom and liquidity trap 
Although the meltdown may not necessarily happen, it is still possible. Then what if baby 
boomers foresee potential meltdowns; or more specifically, can forward-looking baby 
boomers protect themselves against potential meltdowns? We examine this question in 
the following.  
In the above model, to escape from potential capital market meltdowns, baby 
boomers can choose to hold the one-period government bond. However, notwithstanding 
free from price variations, bond may not be a “safe haven” either, because its market-
determined interest rate can be reduced by the flight from capital to bond.    - 24 -
In general, baby boomers’ attempts to flee from capital to short-term and/or riskless 
assets will not be able to shelter them against potential capital market meltdowns, but 
rather tend to drag the general interest rate down to such a level that all assets become as 
“unattractive” as capital.   
With a zero bound on its interest rate, bond will be a safe haven when potential 
meltdowns are so severe that the rate of return to capital becomes negative. Nevertheless, 
with a fixed bond supply
12, the safe haven will be too small to shelter all of baby 
boomers’ wealth. Therefore, a possible scenario will be the following: Baby boomers still 
have to hold capital with negative returns; the bond interest rate is zero; and there is 
excessive demand for bond.  
In sum, even with perfect foresights, baby boomers may have to bear with potential 
capital market (or asset market in general) meltdowns in their old ages as an ill-fated 
consequence of the family plans of their parents and them as parents.  
Nevertheless, a little reflection on reality indicates that baby boomers should at least 
be able to guarantee non-negative returns to their savings, because they can always 
choose to hold on their wage incomes, which tend to be paid in form of money—shoe 
workers in reality are seldom paid in shoes.  
Based on this observation, we have the following conjecture. Should baby boomers 
during their saving ages plan to hold on their monetary wages in order to protect 
themselves against negative returns implied by potential capital market meltdowns during 
their dissaving ages, they may not be able to earn the wages in the first place. That firms 
are willing to pay factors in money is because they expect to recover it via selling the 
                                                 
12 In general, the supply of government bond is driven by government’s fiscal policies and tends not to be 
perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate. Therefore, I assume a fixed bond supply for simplicity.     - 25 -
goods produced by the factors. Yet, baby boomers’ “hoarding” behaviors will make firms 
unable to sell all the goods and hence incur negative profits. Expecting such a situation, 
firms may not want to produce as much. Then, a “liquidity-trap” scenario could happen, 
in which the return to capital as well as the general interest rate is on its zero bound; and 
some baby boomers are unemployed. Based on the above model, we examine this 
conjecture in the following.  
We first modify the above model by assuming that instead of consumption goods, 
firms pay factors with “money”, which is a default-free instrument that promises (by 
firms) to pay its bearer one unit of consumption whenever presented.
13 Accordingly, we 
assume firms accept only money as payments for their goods. To differentiate, we refer to 
the original model (without money) as the “real” model, and the modified model (with 
money) as the “monetary” model.   
Money so modeled is an asset with zero rate of return. Nevertheless, when the rate of 
return to capital is positive, money will be an inferior asset and hence not used as store of 
value. Thus, firms will be able to recover all the monetary factor payments. In this 
situation, money essentially plays the role of medium of exchange, which will not be 
captured by the equilibrium of the economy. In another word, equilibrium will be the 
same in the monetary model as the real model.   
When potential future capital market meltdowns are so severe that the rate of return to 
capital is expected to be negative, money will nonetheless become a relatively attractive 
asset; and its zero rate of interest may provide a zero bound for the rate of return to 
                                                 
13 The assumption of “money” issued by firms is a convenience way to capture the feature of “inside” 
money without explicitly modeling financial intermediation. Another alternative is to assume that firm can 
borrow money from government, pay it as wages, and then recover it from selling goods. Since in 
situations under our consideration firms will recover all the money they pay out, then whether the money is 
issued by firms or borrowed from government will not matter.   - 26 -
capital. With respect to this situation, we in the following examine the equilibrium (or 
lack of which) in the real and monetary models.  
According to the simultaneous system (2.15)-(2.24), a period-zero full-employment 
equilibrium can be characterized by  } ; , , , , , { 1 0 1 1 1 0
b e e e e e e N RR L K R q q  that satisfies the 
following simultaneous system.  
b N L = 0  (3.1) 
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=    (3.6)   
Equation (3.1) represents the full-employment condition in period zero. Equation (3.2), 
derived from equations (2.6), (2.15), (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19), is a necessary condition for 
all the markets being simultaneously cleared. According to this equation, the following 
proposition is self-evident. 
 
Proposition 3.1 Given capital stock K0 and employment L0, the market-clearing period-
zero capital price 
e q0  is uniquely determined.  
 
Equation (3.3) captures the period-zero capital accumulation. Similar to equation (3.2), 
equation (3.4) is the (rationally expected) period-one market clearing condition. Finally,   - 27 -
equations (3.5) and (3.6) represent the determinations of period-one capital income and 
rate of return to capital respectively.  
With respect to the period-one (equilibrium) rate of return to capital in the real model, 
we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.2 In the real model, :
* b N ∃  0 1 =
e RR .  
Corollary 3.1 In the real model,  :
* b b N N < ∀   0 1 >
e RR  
Corollary 3.2 In the real model,  :
* b b N N > ∀   0 1 <
e RR  




b lim q , which, together with inequality (2.37), 




RR . Then, according to inequality (2.38), a unique 
* b N  must 
exist; and Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 are self-evident.  
 
Proposition 3.2 verifies that a large enough period-zero baby boom can lead to potential 
negative rate of return to capital in period one.   
According to Proposition 3.2, when 
* b b N N ≤ , 
e RR1  will be non-negative; hence the 
zero-interest bound in the monetary model will not be binding. Thus, we have the 
following proposition.  
 
Proposition 3.3 
* b b N N ≤ ∀ , equilibria in the monetary and real models are identical.  
 
On the other hand, the existence of the zero-interest bound in the monetary model implies 
that, if  0 1 < RR , consumers will have incentives to hold money as store of value. Then   - 28 -
firms will not be able to recover all their factor payments, which implies that the goods 
market will not be cleared. Therefore, we have the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 3.4  In the monetary model, a necessary condition for goods market 
equilibrium is  0 1 ≥ RR .  
Corollary 3.3  In the monetary model, 
* b b N N > ∀ , equilibrium with all markets 
simultaneously cleared does not exist.   
Proof (by contradiction): Suppose equilibrium  } ; , , , , , {
*
1 0 1 1 1 0
b b e e e e e e N N RR L K R q q >  exists; 
then, according to Corollary 3.2,  0 1 <
e RR , which is in contradiction with Proposition 3.4.  
 
Now it should be clear that, although the zero-interest bound provides forward-looking 
baby boomers an option to protect the value of their wealth, it will be at the cost of 
market equilibrium.  
While equilibrium is usually well defined, “disequilibrium” states are not, depending 
on which market (or markets) is in disequilibrium. Recall that there are five markets in 
the model: labor, goods, capital, rental capital, and bond, among which the capital and 
bond markets are the least likely to be in disequilibrium because of the efficiency of asset 
markets. Disequilibrium in the goods market, which implies negative profits for firms’ 
production, is also not likely to sustain. 
Arguably, the most likely scenario is as follows. Expecting a potential future capital 
market meltdown, baby boomers will avoid holding capital, which will cause low capital 
price and hence lead to insufficient aggregate demand. The impact of the insufficient 
demand will be eventually felt by factor markets as firms reduce production accordingly.   - 29 -
While the rental rate for capital tends to be flexible, the wage rate for labor is likely to be 
rigid. Thus, a disequilibrium state could be such that all other four markets are in 
equilibrium except the labor market. We call such a state as “labor-market 
disequilibrium”, in which there exists (involuntary) unemployment.  
Many factors (e.g. contract or union) can cause wage rigidity, which we will not 
model explicitly but simply assume the following. Firms will pay employed baby 
boomers by their marginal products; and the rest of baby boomers will stay unemployed 
even though they are also willing to work under the current wage rate. 
With respect to such a labor-market disequilibrium state, we have the following 
proposition.   
 
Proposition 3.5 Denote a labor-market disequilibrium as  } ; , , , , , { 1 0 1 1 1 0
b de de de de de de N RR L K R q q . 
Then, 
* b b N N > ∀ ,  } ; , , , , , { } ; , , , , , {
*
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
b e e e e e e b de de de de de de N RR L K R q q N RR L K R q q = .  
 
Proposition 3.5 says that, for any baby-boom magnitude greater than 
* b N , the 
corresponding labor-market disequilibrium state will be “equivalent” to the equilibrium 
state when the baby-boom magnitude is equal to 
* b N . It should be noted that the 
“equivalent” is from an aggregate point of view—with different numbers of baby 
boomers, the two states will certainly not equivalent from individual baby boomers’ 
perspectives. The proof of this proposition is straightforward. As 
* b b N N > , the zero-
interest bound is binding. Thus, the labor-market disequilibrium state needs to satisfy 
equations (3.2)-(3.5) together with  0 1 = RR . Then, according to Proposition (3.2), the   - 30 -
disequilibrium state (with 
* b b N N > ) can be uniquely characterized by the equilibrium 
state (with 
* b b N N = ).   
A self-evident corollary of Proposition 3.5 is as follows.  
 
Corollary 3.4  Denote the period-zero unemployment rate as 
b b b N L N N u / ) ( ) ( 0 − = ; 
then,  0 ) ( * >
>
b b N N
b N u  and  0 / * >
>
b b N N
b dN du . 
 
That is, a labor-market disequilibrium state with unemployment will occur when the 
magnitude of baby boom exceeds 
* b N ; and the larger the baby boom is, the higher the 
unemployment will be.  
 
Summary 
As the baby-boom impact on asset price fluctuations is driven by saving/dissaving 
patterns, forward-looking baby boomers’ attempts to escape from potential capital market 
meltdown will merely drag down the general interest rate level for the entire asset 
markets. The zero-interest bound due to the existence of money can protect baby boomers 
from negative returns in the future; yet that will be at the cost of current unemployment.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
When baby boomers’ large savings cannot be effectively turned into investments due to 
investment impediments, they tend to drive asset price booms. However, whether baby-
boom-driven asset price booms will meltdown (as commonly hypothesized) during baby 
boomers’ retirement eras is state contingent, depending on whether large capital stock   - 31 -
built up by baby boomers’ large savings can generate enough asset demand (indirectly 
through high incomes) to sustain the asset price booms. Whether baby boomers in the 
United States need to worry about the meltdown hypothesis is certainly an empirical 
question. Yet, they may not need to worry too much if they believe that the U.S. asset 
prices are on an upward trend, because our analysis shows that the meltdown tends not to 
happen when asset prices are increasing. To the question of “Sell? Sell to whom?” that 
succinctly captures the essence of the meltdown hypothesis (Siegel, 1999, p.41), our 
analysis provides a comforting answer: “Sell to a richer generation.”  
However, when the meltdown is unfortunately about to happen, baby boomers’ 
attempts to escape it will be futile and merely drag down the general interest rate level for 
the entire asset markets. Although a zero-interest bound (thanks to the existence of 
money) can protect baby boomers against negative returns in the future, it would 
nevertheless be at the cost of current unemployment in a liquidity trap. It is interesting to 
point out that, even when there is no potential meltdown, the liquidity trap can still be 
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Appendix: The condition for positive baby boom impact on q1. 
According to Proposition 2.4,  0 / 1 >
b dN dK . Thus,  0 / 1 >
b dN dq  if  0 / 1 1 > dK dq . Then, 
to determine the condition for  0 / 1 >
b dN dq , we in the following examine the condition 
for the q-K correlation to be positive. 
Abstracted from government bond and tax, equation (2.15) will give the following 
goods market equilibrium condition: 
  t t t t t t I R q K N w N K F + + + + + =
− ) ( ) 2 )( 1 ( ) , (
1 θ θ , (2.15) 
in which output, wage, capital income, and investment are given respectively by  
α α λ
− =
1 ) , ( N K N K F t t , 
α α λ α
− − = N K w t t ) 1 (,  
α α αλ
− − =




t t q I η . 
Substituting them into equation (2.15), we have 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 )( 1 (
1 1 1 1 1 − + + + − + + =
− − − − −
t t t t t t q N K K q N K N K η αλ λ α θ θ λ
α α α α α α , 
which can be simplified into 
1 1 1 − − − − + = η η λ
α α
t t t t q K q N K s    (A.1)   
where ) 1 ( ) 2 (
1 α θ − + =
− s represents the saving rate of the economy.  
By totally differentiating equation (A.1) we can obtain  
t t t t t t t dq dK q dq K dK MPK s
1 ) (




1 1N K MPK t t  is the marginal product of capital. Equation (A.2) can be 
rearranged into    - 33 -
1 1) )( ( /
− − + − = η t t t t t K q sMPK dK dq . (A.3) 
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